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Earnings Momentum in International Markets 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper examines the profitability of earnings momentum strategies based on analyst 
forecast revisions in eleven international equity markets. While analyst forecast revisions 
exhibit persistence in all countries, the profitability of trading strategies based on these 
revisions varies.  Specifically, earnings momentum yields significant profits in Australia, 
Canada, France, Germany, Hong Kong, and the United Kingdom, but not in Malaysia, 
South Korea, Japan, Singapore, or Taiwan.  Interestingly, price momentum exists only in 
those countries where earnings momentum is profitable.  In general, markets with high 
levels of corruption (low investor protection) exhibit weak momentum.  Collectively, 
these findings suggest that the momentum phenomenon is related to information 
dissemination mechanisms within a country.     
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1.  Introduction 
Since the seminal work of Jegadeesh and Titman (JT; 1993), researchers have sought to 
understand the momentum phenomenon.  The empirical fact that the price of recent 
winners (losers) continue to rise (drop) over intermediate horizons (defined as 3 to 12 
month) is puzzling, because it appears to defy even weak-form market efficiency.  The 
academic debate over the source of this phenomenon has also drawn considerable 
attention from financial practitioners, because the magnitude of this phenomenon seems 
to imply economically exploitable trading opportunities.   
 
In this study, we investigate the source of the momentum phenomenon using analyst 
earnings forecasts revisions from eleven international equity markets.  Specifically, we 
investigate whether under-reaction to earnings news is a source of returns continuation in 
those markets that do exhibit price momentum.  Prior studies show that price momentum 
exists in some international markets, but not in others (e.g., Rouwenhorst (1998), 
Hameed and Yuanto (2001), Chui, Titman and Wei (2000)).  However, the source and 
nature of this empirical regularity remains a mystery.  Our study tests the validity of 
alternative explanations for price momentum by examining the speed of stock price 
reaction to earnings news in different markets.  
 
Our empirical design exploits several useful characteristics of analyst forecast revisions. 
Unlike earnings announcements, individual analyst forecast revisions take place 
throughout the year. Because of their frequency and timeliness, these revisions have 
become a vital source of information for many users of corporate financial reports.1  In 
international markets, where corporate earnings are often reported on a bi-annual or 
annual basis, the advantage of the forecast revision signal can be particularly pronounced.  
Yet, to our knowledge, no study has examined the usefulness of analyst forecast revisions 
for returns prediction in an international setting. 
 
                                                 
1  See Gleason and Lee (2003) for a recent summary of U.S. evidence related to the predictive power of 
analyst forecast revisions for future returns. 
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Our primary conjecture is that price momentum and earnings momentum are related.  
This hypothesis derives from recent behavioral models (e.g. Barberis, Shleifer and 
Vishny (BSV; 1998) and Daniel, Hirshleifer and Subrahmanyam (DHS; 1998)) in which 
investors’ mistaken beliefs are proposed as a possible explanation of price momentum 
and post-event price drifts.  In these models, stocks (or countries) that feature greater 
information uncertainty will exhibit greater momentum effects.2   
 
According to these models, both price momentum and earnings momentum are 
manifestations of similar cognitive biases that plague market participants.  Summarizing 
three such models, Hirshleifer (2001) specifically predicts a linkage between price 
momentum and post-earnings-announcement drift: 
 
“… Barberis et al. (1998) and Daniel et al. (1998), but not Hong and Stein 
(1999), further imply that those countries or sets of securities with strongest 
momentum effects should also have strongest post-earnings-announcement 
drift.” 
 
A secondary conjecture of our study is that the momentum phenomenon is related to 
specific institutional features of a country’s information dissemination mechanism.  
Behavioral explanations for momentum invoke investor cognitive biases that lead to 
over- or under-reaction.  However, to the extent that these behavioral biases are universal 
in nature, they cannot explain the existence of momentum in some markets, and its 
absence in others.   The same criticism applies to risk-based explanations, because extant 
evidence suggests that risk factors are similar in global markets (e.g., Fama and French 
(1998), Patel (1998) and Rouwenhorst (1999)), and that differences in country-specific 
risk cannot explain the existence or absence of price momentum across countries.  In this 
                                                 
2 In BSV, the conservatism bias of the representative investor causes insufficient revision to new public 
information, leading to market underreaction.  This bias is most pronounced when firm value is uncertain, 
leading to stronger momentum effects.  In DHS, underreaction to public signals arises due to investors’ 
overconfidence  in the validity of their own private signals.  Stocks that are more difficult to value tend to 
generate greater overconfidence among investors, leading to stronger momentum effects.  Hong and Stein 
(HS; 1999) is silent on this issue. 
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study, we explore institutional features that could lead to sluggish price adjustments to 
firm-specific news in some markets, but not in others. 
 
Our results show that analyst forecast revisions exhibit persistence in all countries, but  
that the profitability of trading strategies based on these revisions varies across countries.  
Specifically, we find that forecast revision strategies yield  significant profits in Australia, 
Canada, France, Germany, Hong Kong, and the United Kingdom, but not in Japan, Korea, 
Malaysia, Singapore, or Taiwan.  In the first six countries, returns to zero-investment 
strategies based on top and bottom quintile portfolios average close to 1% per month over 
the next 3 to 6 months.  In the second set of five countries, returns to forecast revision 
strategies are also generally positive, but not economically or statistically significant. 
 
Consistent with the predictions of DHS and BSV, we find that price momentum exists 
only in those countries where earnings momentum is profitable.  In the first six countries 
(momentum countries), zero- investment price momentum strategies based on top and 
bottom quintiles average more than 1% per month over the next 3 to 6 months.  In the 
second set of five countries (non-momentum countries), returns to similar price 
momentum strategies are generally negative.  Moreover, in those countries that do exhibit 
momentum, we find that both price and earnings revision signals have the incremental 
power to predict future returns – i.e., neither variable is dominated by the other.   
 
These findings provide additional insights into the source of the momentum phenomenon.  
The one-to-one correspondence between earnings momentum and price momentum 
across 11 countries suggests that both are related to investor under-reaction to the public 
disclosure of firm-specific news.  However, the incremental nature of the earnings and 
price signals, in terms of their ability to predict future returns, implies that the 
information investors under-react to is not entirely captured by either variable.  In other 
words, both earnings revisions and past returns are likely to be imperfect proxies for 
some underlying construct (e.g., recent firm-specific news of a broad nature). 
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In further analysis, we explore a number of country-level characteristics that might help 
to explain the existence of momentum effects in some countries but not in others. Our 
investigation focuses on measures of investor protection and/or insider trading legislation.  
Specifically, we propose that the level of investor protection is negatively correlated with 
momentum effects.  In countries where the level of investor protection is low and insiders 
are free to trade on their information, investors do not need to infer the existence of 
good/bad news from the actions of others.  In these markets, prices quickly reflect the 
information held by insiders, thus weakening momentum effects. 
 
Our proposition derives in part from several recent studies that explore the effect of 
information dissemination mechanisms on market behavior.  First, Bhattacharya et al. 
(2000) show that, in Mexico, corporate news announcements are not accompanied by any 
abnormal returns, return volatility, trading volume, or bid-ask spread movements.  They 
provide evidence suggesting that unrestricted insider trading causes Mexican stock prices 
to fully incorporate the information before its public release.  Second, Chui, Titman and 
Wei (2000) show that the common law/civil law distinction provides a perfect indicator 
of whether or not a market exhibited price momentum prior to the 1997 financial crisis in 
Asia.   
 
These findings suggest that investor protection legislations and laws that curtail insider 
trading could exacerbate momentum effects.  In the parlance of BSV and DHS, these 
laws could foster an environment of information uncertainty, which in turn leads to 
stronger momentum effects.  We proxy for this construct using four empirical measures: 
(1) the Efficiency of the Judicial System (JE); (2) the quality of Accounting Standards 
governing corporate disclosures (AS); (3) the extent of Insider Trading Laws (IL); and (4) 
the Corruption Perception Index (CPI), a broad measure of the level of perceived 
corruption within a country.3   
 
                                                 
3 These variables have appeared in prior studies examining the relation between law and finance.  For 
example JE and AS were developed by La Porta et al. (1998); IL appears in Beny (1999), and Gaillard 
(1992)); and CPI, which has been used in many studies, is available from www.transparency.org.  See 
Table VIII for a more detailed description of each variable. 
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The power of these tests is limited, of course, by the fact that our sample features only 11 
countries.  Nevertheless, we find suggestive evidence that markets with high levels of 
corruption (low investor protection) generally exhibit weaker momentum effects.  The 
best single explanatory variable for cross-country variations in momentum effect is CPI.  
This variable is strongly correlated with the profitability of momentum strategies even 
after controlling for country- level betas.     
 
Collectively, our evidence suggests a link between momentum and information 
dissemination mechanisms within a country.  Specifically, we find that price momentum 
exists only when earnings momentum strategies are profitable.  Moreover, the existence 
of momentum appears to require institutional constraints that limit the arbitrage actions of 
more informed traders.  When insiders and other informed parties have relatively 
unrestricted trading privileges, momentum effects are economically insignificant.  
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 discusses related prior 
literature.  Section 3 covers data issues. Section 4 presents the empirical results on 
earnings momentum, price momentum and the relation between the two effects.  Section 
5 investigates country characteristics that could potentially help explain the existence of 
momentum in some countries. Section 6 concludes the paper. 
 
2. Related Literature  
Two different explanations have been put forward to explain the momentum effect in the 
literature. One explanation argues that high momentum stocks tend to earn higher future 
returns because they are fundamentally riskier and thus have higher expected returns (e.g., 
Conrad and Kaul (1998), Moskowitz and Grinblatt (1999)).  However, the weight of the 
evidence to date appears to suggest that conventional risk factors do not explain the 
momentum effect (e.g., Fama and French (1996), Grundy and Martin (1998), Jegadeesh 
and Titman (2002)).  The other explanation is based on behavioral theories that predict 
either investors' under-reaction or over-reaction to fundamental news (e.g., DHS, BSV, 
and HS).  These theories have acquired considerable currency in recent years.  However, 
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they have also been criticized for their ad hoc nature, and inability to generate specific 
testable hypotheses (e.g., Rubinstein (2000)). 
 
The evidence from international markets has only elevated the debate.  For instance, 
Rouwenhorst (1998) documents price momentum in eleven of the  twelve European stock 
markets.  In contrast, several other studies find that momentum strategies are not 
consistently profitable in certain emerging markets and Pacific basin markets.  Hameed 
and Yuanto (2001) find that none of the six Asian countries in their sample exhibits price 
momentum, although a diversified country-neutral strategy generates small but 
statistically significant returns.  Similarly, Chui, Titman and Wei (2000) find that 
individually, in eight Asian markets, a zero- investment momentum strategy is statistically 
profitable only in Hong Kong, although it is profitable when implemented simultaneously 
on the seven stock markets outside Japan.  The fact that momentum exists in some 
countries but not in others is problematic for both behavioral and risk-based explanations. 
 
In this study, we attempt to shed light on the debate by examining the profitability of 
earnings revision strategies in international settings.  Research in the U.S. has 
documented market under-reaction to various types of earnings-related information (e.g., 
Givoly and Lakonishok (1979), Bernard and Thomas (1990)). Comparing the profitability 
of various momentum strategies, Chan, Jegadeesh, and Lakonishok (1996) conclude that 
past earnings surprises, analyst forecast revisions, and past stock returns, all have 
independent explanatory power for future returns. They speculate that the earnings 
momentum effect is caused by the market's under-reaction to short-term earnings 
information, while the price momentum effect is due to the market's under-reaction to a 
broader set of information.  Our study extends this analysis to international markets, and 
examines the correspondence between price and earnings momentum under various 
institutional settings. 
 
3.  Data and Sample Description 
Our sample includes firms from eleven markets: Australia, Hong Kong, Japan, Korea, 
Malaysia, Singapore, Taiwan, Canada, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom.  
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Stock prices and market capitalization datasets are obtained from Datastream. Analyst 
earnings forecasts data is obtained from the I/B/E/S International Summary file. The 
sample period begins in January 1987, the first month for which I/B/E/S provides data on 
analyst forecasts on international firms, and extends to December 2001.   
 
To be included in this analysis, companies must be listed on a major exchange(s) in its 
home country – i.e., we exclude cross- listed foreign stocks.  It must also be in both the 
Datastream and I/B/E/S databases.  To allow for a reasonable number of firms for cross-
sectional analysis, we only include countries with at least 200 stocks that meet our stock 
selection criteria as of December 2001.  
 
Our country characteristic data comes from several sources. The Corruption Perception 
Index (CPI) is obtained from transparency international (www.transparency.org).  This 
variable is a poll of polls from independent institutions. It reflects the perceptions of 
business people, academics, and country analysts on the degree of corruption in 
government and public administration.  Our measure of the severity of insider trading 
laws is derived from Beny (1999).  Other country characteristics such as the efficiency of 
the judicial system and accounting standards are obtained from La Porta et al. (1998). 
 
Previous studies have noted that the quality of international stock market data, especially 
in the emerging markets, is not as good as the U.S. data. We also faced this problem in 
both Datastream and I/B/E/S data. In almost all the countries in our sample, we found 
cases of monthly return exceeding 20,000 percent, and one-year-ahead earnings (FY1) 
forecasts that are greater than 50 times of the current stock prices.  To resolve these 
issues, we exclude firms whose market capitalization or price is below the 5th percentile 
of all the stocks within each country in each month. We also assign as missing, any value  
below the 1 percentile and above the 99 percentile of the return distribution in each 
month for each country. This simple filtering process allows us to weed out all suspicious 
stock return and earnings forecast revision numbers.  This procedure also helps alleviate 
potential illiquidity problems associated with low-priced or extremely small stocks. 
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Table I reports descriptive statistics for each country during our sample period.  The first 
two columns report statistics for Datastream firms; the next two columns report statistics 
for I/B/E/S firms; columns 5 and 6 report statistics associated with firms that are in both 
data sets.  For each country, we report the average number of qualifying firms in each 
month (# of firms), as well as the average of median market capitalizations in each month 
in billions of US dollars (MV).  Start Date is the first month in which we begin to 
implement earnings and price momentum strategies in each country.  The last four 
columns report local currency returns, expressed as percentage per month, between the 
starting date and December 2001.  EW Mean and VW Mean refer to the average equal-
weighted and value-weighted returns, respectively. 
 
Table I shows that over 75% of the Datastream firms are also included in I/B/E/S.4  
Because I/B/E/S adds a company to their database only if there is at least one analyst 
making a forecast on the company, our final sample tends to include the bigger firms in 
each country.  There are more firms toward the end of our sample period for both 
Datastream and I/B/E/S.  Across the 11 countries, Japan had the largest average number 
of qualifying firms each month (812), and Singapore had the fewest (112).   Korean firms 
had the lowest median market capitalization (290 million U. S. dollars), and Japanese 
firms had the highest median market capitalization (3.02 billion U. S. dollars).   
 
All returns are reported in local currency5  because we only study momentum effect 
within each market.  During our sample period, Hong Kong has the highest value-
weighted returns (average of 1.17 percent per month), and Japan had the lowest (-0.02 
percent per month).  Average monthly returns for Taiwan, Korea, and Hong Kong exhibit 
the highest volatility, and average monthly returns for Canada, the U. K., and Australia, 
were least volatile.   
 
 
 
                                                 
4 Specifically, Datastream contains 8,720 firms, of which 6,765 also appears in I/B/E/S.   
5 The data on I/B/E/S are in French Franc for France and Deutsche Mark for Germany prior to January 
1999. We convert these data to Euro using the exchange rates from I/B/E/S. 
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4.  Earnings Momentum, Price Momentum and Forecast Revision 
4. 1. Earnings Momentum and Future Forecast Revisions 
4. 1. 1. Methodology 
Our earnings momentum strategy is implemented for each country individually.  From 
July 1987 to June 20016, we rank stocks within each country on the basis of the change in 
their consensus one-year-ahead (FY1) earnings forecast at the end of each month, scaled 
by price.  If analyst estimates are not revised in a given month, the earnings forecast 
revision from month t to t-1 is zero for that stock. We compute the cumulative price-
deflated revision in analyst earnings forecasts over recent months ( tiREV , ) as a measure 
of earnings momentum.  
 
We implement two sets of earnings momentum strategies with different ranking periods.  
In the first set of strategies, we rank stocks based on their past 3 month forecast revisions, 
while in the second set of strategies we rank stocks based on their past 6 month revisions. 
For purposes of illustration, we use the second set to describe our strategy details and 
report results from both sets of strategies in Table II.  
 
The forecast revision over the past 6 months for firm i in month t is defined as: 
 
å =
--
-=
5
0
1,
,
, j
jti
jti
ti p
rev
REV  
 
where tirev ,  is the change in analyst earnings forecasts in month t for firm i.  
 
In most months, tirev ,  is defined as firm i’s mean FY1 earnings estimate in month t minus 
its mean FY1 estimate in month t-1.  However, in the month when a firm announces its 
fiscal earnings, analysts’ earnings forecasts switch to the new fiscal years after the 
                                                 
6 The earnings momentum strategy starts from September 1989 in Korea and from December 1989 in 
Taiwan. The starting date for these two countries are later than the other countries because we also require 
that there be at least 30 stocks in the extreme quintile portfolios, and there were too few observations in the 
first 2-3 years in these two countries.  
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announcement, and the FY1 estimates in two consecutive months could be forecasts for 
two different fiscal years.  We make several adjustments to ensure that the change in 
earnings forecast is the difference between two consecutive forecasts for the same fiscal 
year.  Suppose a firm announces its earnings in month t.  If the announcement date is 
before the date when I/B/E/S compiles the mean estimate in that month, tirev ,  is defined 
as its mean FY1 estimate in month t minus its mean FY2  estimate in month t-1. On the 
other hand, if the announcement occurs after I/B/E/S compiles the mean estimate in that 
month, then tirev ,  is still defined as the difference between month t and t-1’s mean FY1  
estimates, but 1, +tirev  is defined as the mean FY1 estimate in month t+1 minus the mean 
FY2 estimate in month t.  
 
As a robustness check, we also used a second definition of forecast revision, defined as 
the difference in FY1 earnings estimate at month t and month t-6, scaled by stock price at 
the end of month t :  
 
ti
titi
ti p
FYFY
REV
,
6,,
,
11 --=  
 
Again we made the necessary adjustments if the fiscal year switches between month t-6 
and t.  The results using this alternative definition are essentially the same as those using 
the first definition.  So for brevity, we just report results using the first definition. 
 
Researchers have also used two other measures of earnings surprises: the most recent 
standardized unexpected earnings (SUE) and the cumulative abnormal stock return 
around the most recent earnings announcement date (ABR). We focus on past earnings 
estimate revisions for a number of reasons.  First, the use of data related to past earnings 
announcements (SUE or ABR) is problematic in international settings, where firms 
typically report earnings on an annual basis.7 Therefore, if we rank stocks on the basis of 
their most recent SUE or ABR, the information on earnings surprise could be quite stale. 
                                                 
7 Quarterly earnings data are available in Canada. Semi-annual earnings data are available in Japan. 
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Second, the expectation model for annual earnings is extremely noisy.  Time series 
models for expected earnings using annual data have little power.  Moreover, model 
parameters are difficult to estimate given our relatively short sample period. Finally, even 
though analyst forecasts may be collectively biased, an upward or downward revision in a 
specific firm’s consensus estimate should still convey information about a firm's 
improving (deteriorating) fundamentals. Indeed, Chan et al. (1996) find that in the U.S., 
momentum profit based on revision in analyst forecasts (9.7% over the first year after 
portfolio formation) is higher than those based on SUE (7.5%) or ABR (8.3%).8  
 
After the stocks are ranked, they are assigned to one of five quintile portfolios in each 
month.  The bottom quintile portfolio contains stocks with the most unfavorable earnings 
forecast revisions, while the top quintile portfolios are the stocks with most favorable 
revisions. Our trading strategy is implemented as in Jegadeesh and Titman (1993): we 
construct overlapping portfolios and compute equal weighted returns for each portfolio in 
each month.  For instance, for a holding period of six months, the portfolio with the most 
favorable revisions in a given month (E5) consists of six overlapping portfolios from the 
previous six ranking months.  Returns for the E5 portfolio is the simple average return of 
the six portfolios formed in each of the past six months.  If a stock's return is missing 
during the holding period, we replace it with the corresponding value-weighted market 
return. The earnings momentum portfolio is the zero- investment portfolio that buys the 
most favorable revision portfolio and sells the least favorable revision portfolio (E5-E1) 
in each month.  
 
Our strategy differs slightly from Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) in one respect.  After 
ranking stocks according to their past returns, JT skip one month before buying stocks to 
avoid bid-ask spread and stock price reversal in the very short term.  We do not skip one 
month here for two reasons.  First, we rank stocks based on their earnings and not past 
returns information, so our signal is not subject to the no bid-ask spread problem.  Second, 
                                                 
8 Concerned with noise in the revision measure, particularly among low coverage firms, we also performed 
the same analysis using only stocks that have at least two analysts providing forecasts. However, the results 
are essentially the same as the results using the whole sample. For brevity, we only report the results using 
the whole sample. 
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almost all earnings consensus estimates are available between the 10th and the 20th day of 
the month, so we have already skipped about a half-month when we start holding 
positions at the beginning of next month.   
 
4. 1. 2. Earnings Momentum Strategy Returns 
Table II summarizes the average monthly returns on these long-short portfolios formed 
from July 1987 to June 2001. Panel A reports results based on past three month earnings 
revisions and holding period of 1, 3 and 6 months. Panel B reports results based on past 
six month revisions.  
 
These results show that an earnings momentum strategy is not consistently profitable  
across all markets.  Six countries (Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Hong Kong, and 
United Kingdom (UK); Earnings Momentum Countries, hereafter) exhibit positive profits 
that are statistically significant.  For example, in the UK, with a holding period of six 
months, the portfolio with most favorable forecast revisions in the past six month (E5) 
earns 1.11% per month and the portfolio with least favorable revisions (E1) earns 0.15% 
per month. The difference between E5 and E1 is 0.96% per month (t value = 5.22).  More 
importantly, the difference in average monthly returns between E5 and E1 is significantly 
positive in all combinations of ranking period (3 or 6 months) and holding period (1, 3 or 
6 months).   
 
In the other five countries (Japan, Korea, Malaysia, Singapore, Taiwan; Non-Earnings 
Momentum Countries, hereafter), we find no statistically reliable evidence of earnings 
momentum.  Strategies based on past 3-month forecast revisions generate positive returns 
over most holding periods.  However, none of these returns are statistically significant.  
Among these countries, Singapore exhibits the strongest earnings momentum effect.  But 
even in Singapore, the average returns to the revision-based strategy are less than ha lf of 
those experienced in the earnings momentum countries.   
 
Among all countries, momentum profits decrease with the length of the holding period. 
For example, with a 6-month ranking period in Australia, the momentum strategy profits 
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(t-stat) are 1.30 (4.02), 1.18(3.98), 0.92 (3.60) for holding periods of 1, 3, and 6 months, 
respectively. Apparently return continuation is strongest during the first 3 months after 
portfolio formation. As the holding period increases, the continuation weakens, and can 
even turn into return reversals.  For instance, with a 6-month ranking period in Taiwan, 
the profit is positive (0.06) for a 1-month holding period, but turns negative if the holding 
period increases to 3 or 6 month (-0.15 and -0.17).  
 
To summarize, two salient facts emerge from this table: first, six countries show strong 
earnings momentum while five other countries do not. Second, among all countries, 
earnings momentum is most pronounced in the first 1 to 3 months, and becomes weaker 
as the holding period increases. 
 
4. 1. 3. Relationship between Current and Future Revisions 
It has been well documented in the U.S. that analyst forecast revisions exhibit persistence 
over time.  For example, Gleason and Lee (2003) show that after an upward (downward) 
revision, other analysts are more likely to issue further upward (downward) revisions.  
They also find that the market continues to be surprised in the three-day event windows 
around these subsequent forecast revisions.  On average, short-window event returns are 
predictable for up to the next six revisions (even after excluding all revisions that occur 
within two days of each other).  They attribute this post-revision price drift to investors’ 
failure to fully incorporate the implications of current forecast revisions for future 
revisions.  As a result, the market continues to be surprised in the same direction as later 
analysts revise their forecasts.     
 
In Table III, we explore the persistence of forecast revisions in each country.  Table 
values represent the cumulative earnings forecast revisions over the next three (J=3) or 
six (J=6) months after portfolio formation, expressed as a percentage of price.   As in 
Table 2, we report results for portfolios with the most favorable revisions (E5), portfolios 
with the least favorable revisions (E1), and the middle portfolios (E3).  Panel A results 
are for portfolios formed on the past three-months (K=3), and Panel B results are for 
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portfolios formed on the past six months (K=6) of forecast revisions.  We also compute 
the difference between E5 and E1.  
 
Because table values represent cumulative price-deflated revisions over three or six 
months, and portfolios are formed monthly, these observations overlap.  The time series 
of revisions for these portfolios are autocorrelated up to five lags for six-month 
cumulative revisions, and up to two lags for three-month cumulative revisions. Therefore, 
we compute t-statistics using Newey-West asymptotically consistent standard errors.  
 
The average revisions on these portfolios are almost always negative.  This is consistent 
with the fact that analyst forecasts tend to be initially over-optimistic, and are 
subsequently revised downward.  More important are the results reported in the E5-E1 
column, which are reliably positive for all countries.  These results show that, in all 11 
countries, stocks with the most favorable recent revisions continue to experience more 
favorable revisions over the next three to six months. 
 
Consider UK as an example: in earnings momentum strategy based on past six month 
forecast revision, the E1 portfolio continue to have very unfavorable revision over the 
next six month after portfolio formation (-2.95%), while the average forecast revision on 
E5 portfolio is nearly zero (-0.13%). So the difference in earnings surprises between E5 
and E1 is 2.82% (t statistics = 4.25) over the next six months.  If this difference is not 
fully anticipated at the time of portfolio formation, investors will experience subsequent  
surprises in the same direction resulting, in returns continuation.  
 
It is somewhat more surprising to observe a strong pattern of revision persistence in non-
earnings momentum countries.  Korea is an extreme example.  Table II results show that 
earnings momentum strategies based on past six month revisions yield negative returns in 
Korea for holding periods of 1, 3 and 6 months.  Yet Table III shows that the average 
cumulative forecast revision of E5-E1 is reliably positive in the three and six months after 
portfolio formation. The evidence suggests that the pattern of gradual information-
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diffusion is observed among analysts in all countries even though return continuation is 
observed among only some countries. 
 
Across the 11 countries, the strength of the revision continuation appears to be related to 
the magnitude of earnings momentum profits. The difference in future revisions between 
E5 and E1 is much larger for the six earnings momentum countries than for the five non-
earnings momentum countries.  Also, among the non-earnings momentum countries, 
those with positive earnings momentum profits (Japan, Malaysia, and Singapore) have 
stronger revision continuation than the countries with negative earnings momentum 
profits (Korea, Taiwan).  So at least part of the earnings momentum profits is perhaps 
attributable to the strength of revision continuation and the contemporaneous price 
reaction.  
 
Two conditions are necessary for mispricing to occur: (1) systematic noise trading, and (2) 
constrained arbitrage.  Prior research suggests that persistence in analyst forecast 
revisions could arise from their tendency to herd, 9  the sequential nature of individual 
revisions,10 or their general reluctance to provide negative information.11  But revision 
persistence alone would not lead to returns continuation if investors are aware of 
analysts’ tendencies, and can fully accommodate them in establishing prices. The fact 
that they are successful in doing so in some countries, and not in others, suggests that 
certain arbitrage forces are operating more effectively in some countries than in others.  
We explore this issue in more detail in later sections. 
  
4.2 Price Momentum 
In the previous subsection, we document that some markets adjust slowly to earnings 
information conveyed in analyst forecast revisions (earnings momentum), but  that similar 
sluggish price adjustment does not exist in other markets.  If the sluggish price 
adjustment to earnings news is driven by a country’s market characteristics, we should 
                                                 
9 See Trueman (1994), Welch (2000). 
10 Gleason and Lee (2003). 
11 See Miller (1977), McNichols and O’Brien (1997), and Scherbina (2001). 
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observe slow price adjustment not only to forecast revisions, but also to other types of 
firm-specific information.   
 
In this section, we study price momentum effect in our sample countries. We are 
particularly interested in investigating whether price momentum is more pronounced in 
markets where stock prices under-react to earnings information.  In other words, we 
investigate whether prices also adjust sluggishly to a broader set of firm-specific 
information in the markets where earnings momentum strategies are profitable.  We also 
study the behavior of analyst revisions during the process of price adjustment to this 
broad set of new information. 
 
4. 2. 1. Price Momentum and Its Relationship with Earnings Momentum 
As a first step, we implement the standard K-1-J price momentum strategy as in 
Jegadeesh and Titman (1993). Similar to our earnings momentum strategies, the price 
momentum strategies are based on past three- and six-month (K=3 or 6) returns and we 
consider holding periods of one, three and six months (J=3 or 6). Table IV reports the 
average monthly returns for the past loser portfolio (P1), middle portfolio (P3), winner 
portfolio (P5), and the zero- investment, winner- loser (P5-P1) portfolio.  
 
Consistent with prior research, we find statistically significant profits to price momentum 
strategies in Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Hong Kong and the UK. In these 
countries, the average return of the momentum portfolio (P5-P1) is statistically 
significant for almost all combinations of ranking period and holding period. 12  
Interestingly, these are also precisely the countries that exhibit earnings momentum. 
Comparing the magnitude of price momentum profits and earnings momentum profits, 
we find that price momentum is stronger than earnings momentum in each of the six 
countries.  Consistent with previous studies, we also find little or no return continuation 
in Japan, Korea, Malaysia, Singapore and Taiwan.  The price momentum profits in these 
countries is either insignificant or negative for all combination of (K, J).  Again 
consistent with our conjecture, these countries also exhibit no earnings momentum.  
                                                 
12 The only exception is in Hong Kong when K = 3, J = 1, 3 and K = 6, J = 1. 
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Our findings thus far support the prediction by Hirsleifer (2001) – countries with the 
strongest price momentum effects also have the strongest earnings momentum effects.  
 
It is possible that price momentum strategies are not profitable because return 
continuation happens mostly in the first month after portfolio formation.  Our price-based 
strategies skip one month in between ranking and holding periods, and would not capture 
this effect.  To investigate this possibility, we implement a strategy based on prior one 
month return and hold the stocks for one month immediately after ranking (i.e. 1-0-1 
strategy).  The results are reported in panel C of Table IV.  Not surprisingly, we still find 
positive profit for the six momentum countries.  However, momentum profit is strikingly 
negative in the five non-momentum countries. Thus we find no evidence of underreaction 
in these markets even over short horizons. 
 
4. 2. 2. Future Forecast Revisions for Price Momentum Portfolios 
Table V examines analyst forecast revisions during the holding period for various price 
momentum portfolios.  This evidence addresses an important distinction between risk-
based and mispricing-based explanations.  If price momentum arises because investors do 
not fully understand the implications of past returns for future earnings news, we should 
observe a systematic relation between past returns and future analyst forecast revisions.  
Specifically, recent winners (losers) should display more (less) favorable forecast 
revisions over the next 3 to 6 months.  Risk-based explanations, which assert that price 
momentum effects are due to cross-sectional risk differences, would make no such 
prediction. 
 
Table V shows that analysts tend to revise earnings forecasts for past winners more 
favorably than for past losers in every country.  We find a strong, monotonically 
increasing, pattern in the revisions from P1 to P5, and highly significant t-statistics for the 
P5-P1 portfolio in all eleven markets.  Our evidence shows that the tendency for analyst 
forecast revisions to lag current returns is universal.  However, as Table IV shows, this  
slow adjustment by analysts does not necessary lead to slow adjustment of prices. In the 
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five markets without price momentum, revision continuation exists, but prices seem not 
to exhibit such slow adjustment.   
 
Van Dijk and Huibers (2002) study price momentum effects in the European markets. 
They find positive price momentum and revision continuation in those markets, and they 
conclude that the momentum effect is caused by analyst underreaction to new earnings 
information. However, our findings show that analyst underreaction is at most a 
necessary, but certainly not a sufficient condition, for price underreaction.  Apparently 
arbitrage forces operate more effectively in some markets than in others.   
 
4. 3 Two-way Classifications based on Earnings and Price Momentum 
An important unresolved issue is whether forecast revisions and past returns both have 
incremental ability to predict returns in international markets.  If the price and earnings 
momentum are identical phenomena, perhaps we should not be surprised to find a one-to-
one correspondence across different markets.  On the other hand, U. S. evidence suggests 
that they are both under-reactions to correlated, but not identical, types of firm-specific 
information. We address this issue by examining earnings momentum while controlling 
for past returns, and by examining price momentum while controlling for past earnings 
forecast revisions. 
 
At the end of each month, we rank stocks on the basis of their past six-month returns and 
assign them to one of the three equally-numbered price portfolios (P1, P2 and P3). We 
then independently rank the stocks based on their past six-month forecast revisions and 
assign them to one of the three equally-numbered earnings portfolios (E1, E2 and E3). 
Following these rankings, each stock belongs to one of nine portfolios. We consider 
standard K-1-J momentum strategies with holding periods of three and six months.  
 
Table VI reports average monthly return for each of the nine portfolios. Returns to each 
strategy controlling for the other is also reported (see P3-P1 or E3-E1).  The results 
indicate that in all six countries where both earnings momentum and price momentum are 
present, one effect is not subsumed by the other.  This table shows that holding constant 
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price momentum (e.g. just consider stocks in the winner (P3) portfolios), stocks with 
favorable revisions in the past outperform stocks with unfavorable revisions (E3-E1 is 
positive), and the difference is significant in most cases. The opposite case is also true; 
when we hold past revisions at a certain level, recent winners outperform recent losers 
(P3-P1 is positive).  For example, consider a 6-1-6 strategy in UK.  Holding past forecast 
revisions fixed, past winners outperform past losers by 0.99 percent per month. On the 
other hand, holding past returns fixed, the portfolios with past favorable revisions 
outperform portfolios with unfavorable revisions by 0.51 percent per month.  
 
These findings suggest that both momentum effects represent underreaction to similar, 
but not identical, types of information. We also observe that in all six momentum 
countries, price momentum profits while keeping past revisions fixed are greater than 
earnings momentum profits with fixed past returns.  This is consistent with the univariate 
results in the previous two sections, reconfirming that underreaction to a broad set of 
information (conveyed by past returns) is stronger than underreaction to specific 
information such as earnings (conveyed by past forecast revisions).  
 
Another interesting aspect of our findings is that in the five non-momentum countries, 
neither price momentum conditional on past revisions nor earnings momentum 
conditional on past returns is significant in most cases. We only observe significant 
positive earnings momentum profits in Japan and Singapore when the stocks in the 
winner portfolios are considered.  Earlier, we showed that unconditionally, neither price 
momentum nor earnings momentum is significant in these countries. Combined with the 
results of these conditional momentum strategies, we conclude that underreaction to 
information is relatively weak or does not exist in these five countries. 
 
As an alternative test, we also conduct Fama-MacBeth (1973) cross-sectional regressions  
for each country. Each ranking month, we regress the 6-month buy-and-hold return for 
each stock on its past six-month forecast revision, past six-month return, and firm size. 
To account for possible nonlinearities in the regression equations and to facilitate 
comparison between coefficients, we express each explanatory variable in terms of its 
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ordinal ranking and scale it cross-sectionally to [0,  1]. We run regressions on three 
models for each country individually.  
 
Table VII reports the time-series averages of the slope coefficients, and their 
autocorrelation-adjusted t-statistics13. The regression results confirm our findings from 
the two-way classification momentum strategies. In the six momentum countries, taken 
individually or together, both past returns and past revisions have explanatory power for 
the future six-month return. The coefficients for past returns are larger than those for past 
revisions, consistent with the observation that price momentum strategies are more 
profitable than earnings momentum. In the five non-momentum countries, none of the 
coefficients on past revisions and past returns is significantly positive, indicating that 
stock prices do not underreact to information conveyed in analysts’ forecast revisions or 
past returns. 
 
5.  Investor Protection and Momentum Effects 
Our earlier results indicate that information diffusion and price adjustment processes 
operate quite differently across these 11 countries.  While analysts respond sluggishly to 
recent firm-specific news in all markets, stock prices do not.  Indeed, stock prices in some 
countries adjust quickly and in an unbiased manner to emerging news while those in 
other countries do not.  In this section, we explore a number of institutional differences 
among these markets to explain why prices respond differently to information. 
 
Our investigation focuses on aspects of the information dissemination mechanism within 
a country that could either hinder or enhance the market’s ability to incorporate firm-
specific news.  Specifically, we are interested in factors that could potentially constrain 
informational arbitrage.  As a starting point, we examine the amount of latitude given to 
insiders (or, conversely, the degree of protection provided to outside shareholders) within 
a country’s regulatory system. 
 
                                                 
13 The t-statistics are adjusted up to 5 lags because the six month return in each monthly regression is 
measured over 5 overlapping intervals. 
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In markets where investors are poorly protected, it is quite likely that prices are 
established largely by corporate insiders.  In such markets, corporate announcements 
have little or no information content (e.g., Bhattacharya et al. (2000)), and analysts have 
less incentive to invest in the acquisition of private information (Bushman et al. (2003)).  
At the same time, it is quite possible that in these markets arbitrage forces are better able 
to eliminate momentum effects.   
 
We use several empirical measures to attempt to capture this underlying construct, 
described in Table VIII.  Our primary proxy is the Corruption Perception Index (CPI), 
compiled by Transparency International.  Corruption is the result of a combination of 
incomplete laws and poor law enforcement, and CPI captures this construct by 
integrating results from more than 12 different polls.  Prior studies indicate that this 
variable is a useful proxy for the general level of corruption within a country (e.g., Lee 
and Ng (2002)). A high value for CPI indicates low levels of corruption or high levels of 
investor protection. 
 
The CPI also has the advantage of being more available over our sample period.  We also 
collected data for the efficiency of the judicial system (JE), and the quality of accounting 
standards from La Porta et al. (1998) (AS), and on insider trading laws from Beny (1999) 
(IL) (higher values for all three variables suggest higher judicial efficiency, stronger 
accounting standards and insider trading laws). However, these variables are either 
averages over a certain period or values measured at a point of time.  In contrast, we have 
annual CPI data for each country from 1995-2001, and multi-year averages between 1988 
and 1992.  This data allow us to perform Fama-MacBeth regressions and improve the 
power of our tests.  
 
Panel A in Table IX presents descriptive statistics for these country characteristic 
variables.  Table values represent the average for each country over the sample period.  
The first two columns report average monthly returns to a winner- loser portfolio in each 
country, based on six-month estimation and six-month holding periods (J=6, K=6).  The 
other columns report country characteristic variables.  The first row of Panel B reports a 
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cross-sectional regression of CPI on the other three explanatory variables.  As expected, 
the three variables (JS, AS, and IL) are highly positively correlated with CPI – over 80% 
of the variation in the level of corruption is explained by the three variables suggesting 
that stronger judicial efficiency, accounting standards, and insider trading laws are 
associated with lower levels of corruption.  
 
The remaining rows in Panel B report cross-sectional regressions of earnings momentum 
profits (EMOM) and price momentum profits (PMOM) on various country characteristics.  
Individually, judicial efficiency (JE), accounting standards (AS), and Corruption (CPI) 
each have some ability to explain momentum effects.  Insider trading laws (IL) do not 
appear correlated with the magnitude of these profits. 14   The strongest relation is 
observed between CPI and momentum profits.  This holds for both earnings and price 
momentum. 
 
In Panel C, we conduct Fama-MacBeth cross-sectional regressions of annual momentum 
profits on CPI and country beta, estimated with respect to the value-weighted world 
market index.  To the extent that corruption is a proxy for country- level risk, the insertion 
of beta in this regression should eliminate the relation observed in Panel B.  However, 
our results show that country betas are negatively correlated with momentum profits.  
More importantly, the explanatory power of CPI for momentum is robust to the inclusion 
of country beta in this regression.   
 
In summary, our findings suggest that country-level corruption is correlated with the 
profitability of momentum strategies in world markets.  These results need to be 
interpreted with caution, as we have only 11 observations.  Nevertheless, they do suggest 
a link between the profitability of momentum strategies and information dissemination 
mechanisms within a country. 
 
 
                                                 
14 We are not sure whether this result is due to the low power of these regressions, or the imprecision of this 
measure.  Bushman et al. (2003) and others note that it might be the enforcement of insider laws rather than 
their existence that have a bearing on the way markets function within a country.   
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5.  Summary and Discussion 
The momentum phenomenon has generated much interest among both academics and 
practitioners.  In recent years, researchers have looked to evidence from foreign markets 
to either confirm or reject the patterns observed in U. S. markets.  Yet the international 
evidence has only elevated the debate.  To date, this research has documented price 
momentum effects in most US and European markets, but not in most Asian and other 
emerging markets.  At first blush, the success of momentum strategies in some countries 
but not others does not appear to be consistent with either risk-based or behavioral-based 
explanations. 
 
In this paper, we investigate a related phenomenon in an international setting.  We find 
that earnings momentum strategies, implemented using analyst forecast revisions, are not 
consistently profitable in the global markets. More importantly, consistent with the 
predictions of some behavioral models, we document a one-to-one correspondence 
between earnings momentum countries and price momentum countries.  We also find that 
analyst underreaction to past information is a common phenomenon around the world.  
However, this behavior does not necessarily lead to momentum in stock returns. Using 
level of corruption as a proxy, we identify the level of investor protection as an important 
country characteristic that is highly correlated with both earnings and price momentum 
effects.  
 
Our evidence appears most consistent with a behavioral model in which arbitrage costs 
vary across markets.  In noise trader models, two conditions are necessary for mispricing 
to occur: (1) systematic noise trading, and (2) constrained arbitrage.  Our evidence 
suggests that analysts underreact to past information in all countries.  However, this 
effect alone would not lead to returns continuation if enough informed investors are 
aware of analysts’ tendencies, and can fully accommodate them in establishing prices.  
The fact that they are successful in doing so in some countries, and not in others, suggest 
that certain arbitrage forces are operating more effectively in some countries than in 
others.   
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Our evidence suggests that the effectiveness with which arbitrage forces operate within a 
country is captured, in some measure, by its investor protection and accounting laws.  
Specifically, in countries with stringent investor protection laws (i.e. lower levels of 
corruption), momentum profits are generally higher.  In countries with lax laws (i.e. 
higher levels of corruption), momentum profits are negligible. 
 
Our evidence is limited by the nature of the data, and is by no means conclusive.  We 
only have information on eleven countries, and there are many other potential market 
characteristics that could help explain the momentum effects.  For example, cultural and 
institutional differences across Asian and European countries might offer a competing 
explanation.  As data becomes more available, we hope that future researchers will 
expand our analysis to explore these and other possible explanations. 
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# of firms MV # of firms MV # of firms MV Start Date EW Mean Stdev VW Mean Stdev
Australia 272 0.62 156 1.12 151 1.13 8707 0.37 4.82 0.73 5.16
Canada 387 0.49 253 0.72 242 0.72 8707 0.54 4.50 0.75 4.02
France 325 1.32 249 1.75 232 1.75 8707 0.73 5.61 0.94 5.76
Germany 379 1.27 270 1.70 268 1.70 8707 0.22 5.12 0.76 5.53
Hong Kong 291 0.68 164 1.21 160 1.21 8707 0.71 10.11 1.17 9.37
UK 689 1.45 534 1.82 532 1.82 8707 0.54 5.01 0.65 4.66
Japan 1748 1.60 814 3.02 812 3.02 8707 0.04 7.08 -0.02 6.02
Korea 508 0.19 348 0.29 347 0.29 8909 0.71 10.25 0.57 10.11
Malaysia 305 0.30 166 0.47 166 0.47 8707 1.00 11.07 0.76 9.26
Singapore 169 0.43 113 0.59 112 0.59 8707 0.63 9.73 0.37 7.14
Taiwan 312 0.83 232 1.01 228 1.01 8912 0.40 11.14 0.26 11.05
The total number of firms at the intersection of Datastream and IBES is 6765. Datastream alone has 8720 firms.
Return in Local CurrencyAll Criteria
Table I
Summary Statistics, January 1987 - December 2001
Country
Datastream I/B/E/S
This table reports the average number of firms, the starting date, the average return and standard deviation of the return for each country included in the 
study. The data are obtained from two sources: Stock prices, market capitalization, book to market, volume data are obtained from Datastream. Analyst 
earnings forecasts data are obtained from the I/B/E/S International Summary file. To be included in our sample, a stock should have coverage on both 
Datastream and the I/B/E/S. The study only includes the countries with at least 200 stocks that qualify our stock selection criteria in December 2001. There 
are eleven countries included in our sample. Within each country, we exclude firms whose market capitalization is below 5% of all stocks available on 
Datastream in each month. We also exclude stocks whose return is below the 1 percentile or above 99% percentile of the return distribution in each month. 
The average number of firms for each country (# of firms) is the mean of the number of qualifying firms in each month from the starting date to December 
2001. MV is the average of the median market capitalization in each month in billions of US dollars. Start Date is the date when we begin to implement 
earnings and price momentum strategies in each country. Returns are reported in local currency and are expressed as percentage per month between the 
starting date and December 2001. The last four columns give the average monthly equal-weighted (EW Mean) and value-weighted (VW Mean) returns 
and standard deviation (Stdev) using only the stocks that qualify all selection criteria for each country. 
E1 E3 E5 E5-E1 t-stat E1 E3 E5 E5-E1 t-stat
1 -0.53 0.13 0.85 1.39 4.74 -0.44 0.51 0.86 1.30 4.02
3 -0.37 0.27 0.87 1.25 4.92 -0.36 0.52 0.82 1.18 3.98
6 -0.24 0.26 0.78 1.03 4.68 -0.15 0.46 0.77 0.92 3.60
1 -0.42 0.78 1.38 1.80 6.72 -0.39 0.69 1.33 1.72 6.33
3 -0.19 0.68 1.22 1.41 5.92 -0.06 0.67 1.22 1.27 4.79
6 0.03 0.66 1.06 1.03 4.73 0.19 0.57 1.01 0.82 3.20
1 0.12 0.77 1.22 1.10 4.61 0.06 0.92 1.31 1.25 5.24
3 0.23 0.81 1.17 0.95 4.98 0.11 0.87 1.20 1.09 5.44
6 0.26 0.75 1.15 0.90 6.19 0.21 0.77 1.13 0.92 5.33
1 -0.24 0.28 0.71 0.95 4.88 -0.30 0.31 0.77 1.07 4.85
3 -0.21 0.32 0.69 0.90 5.54 -0.29 0.23 0.68 0.96 4.87
6 -0.17 0.32 0.60 0.77 5.02 -0.19 0.27 0.59 0.78 4.31
1 0.15 0.71 1.19 1.04 3.62 0.13 0.93 1.15 1.02 3.08
3 0.26 0.86 1.08 0.81 2.92 0.30 0.87 1.07 0.77 2.43
6 0.40 0.75 1.01 0.61 2.45 0.36 0.68 1.01 0.65 2.28
1 -0.19 0.60 1.14 1.33 7.25 -0.08 0.48 1.20 1.28 6.36
3 -0.03 0.50 1.08 1.11 6.60 0.04 0.42 1.13 1.09 5.70
6 0.09 0.44 1.02 0.93 6.00 0.15 0.39 1.11 0.96 5.22
1 0.04 -0.07 0.23 0.18 1.13 0.05 -0.04 0.33 0.28 1.65
3 0.06 -0.05 0.26 0.20 1.36 0.08 -0.04 0.28 0.21 1.28
6 0.10 -0.08 0.26 0.16 1.26 0.13 -0.06 0.20 0.07 0.50
1 0.57 0.53 0.92 0.35 1.22 1.08 0.23 0.98 -0.10 -0.30
3 0.64 0.71 0.84 0.21 0.87 1.10 0.36 0.91 -0.20 -0.61
6 0.82 0.57 0.73 -0.09 -0.36 1.12 0.46 0.74 -0.38 -1.18
1 0.76 1.09 1.26 0.49 1.36 0.84 1.04 1.30 0.46 1.15
3 0.71 1.14 1.13 0.43 1.44 0.94 1.01 1.14 0.20 0.57
6 0.87 1.04 1.03 0.15 0.58 1.03 0.96 1.05 0.03 0.08
1 0.21 0.82 0.82 0.61 1.83 0.46 0.60 1.04 0.58 1.70
3 0.34 0.76 0.79 0.44 1.67 0.46 0.75 0.87 0.41 1.31
6 0.46 0.60 0.81 0.35 1.51 0.51 0.60 0.92 0.40 1.44
1 0.46 0.42 0.73 0.27 0.82 0.20 0.62 0.26 0.06 0.16
3 0.52 0.48 0.71 0.18 0.60 0.47 0.48 0.32 -0.15 -0.46
6 0.50 0.55 0.63 0.13 0.52 0.54 0.37 0.37 -0.17 -0.66
Panel B: Earnings Momentum Based on 
Past 6-Month Forecast Revision
Table II
Profitability of Earnings Momentum Strategies
Panel A: Earnings Momentum Based on 
Past 3-Month Forecast RevisionHolding
Period, J
Hong Kong
Japan
Korea
Malaysia
Country
Australia
Canada
France
Germany
UK
Singapore
Taiwan
At the end of each month from July 1987 to December 2000, stocks in each country are ranked on the basis of 
their past change in consensus analyst earnings forecasts, which is measured by cumulative price -deflated 
revisions in the past three(six) months. Stocks are then assigned to five quintile portfolios and euqal weighted 
returns are computed for each portfolio. The bottom 20% is assigned as the E1 portfolio and the top 20% as the 
E5 portfolio. The trading strategy J -P-K is implemented as Jegadeesh and T itman (1993): we construct 
overlapping portfolios. In each month, the portfolio with most favorable (unfavorable) past revisions is an 
overlapping portfolio that consists of E5(E1) portfolios in the previous K ranking months. Returns for the 
favorable (unfavorable) overlapping portfolios are the simple average of the returns of the six E5(E1) portfolios. 
If a stock's return is missing during the holding period, we replace it with the corresponding value -weighted 
market return. The earnings momentum portfolio (E5-E1) is the zero-cost portfolio that buys the favorable 
revision portfolio and sells the unfavorable revision portfolio (E5-E1) in each month. Panel A reports the results 
for strategies based on past three month forecast revision. Panel B reports the results for strategies based on past 
six month forecast revision. The returns are in respective local currencies. 
J E1 E3 E5 E5-E1 t-stat E1 E3 E5 E5-E1 t-stat
Australia 3 -1.41 -0.23 -0.09 1.32 8.71 -1.35 -0.18 -0.19 1.16 6.47
6 -2.59 -0.47 -0.43 2.17 7.90 -2.40 -0.33 -0.57 1.83 4.47
Canada 3 -2.56 -0.37 -0.21 2.35 5.27 -2.50 -0.38 -0.18 2.33 3.69
6 -4.83 -0.68 -0.67 4.15 4.16 -4.90 -0.77 -0.53 4.37 3.22
France 3 -1.13 -0.22 -0.12 1.01 3.73 -1.18 -0.21 -0.14 1.04 4.27
6 -2.22 -0.51 -0.29 1.93 4.16 -2.36 -0.45 -0.34 2.02 4.13
Germany 3 -1.20 -0.19 -0.18 1.02 4.23 -1.24 -0.14 -0.16 1.08 3.21
6 -2.38 -0.44 -0.36 2.01 3.64 -2.49 -0.39 -0.41 2.08 2.02
Hong Kong 3 -1.64 -0.34 0.05 1.68 4.95 -1.70 -0.30 0.04 1.74 3.94
6 -3.27 -0.70 -0.15 3.12 5.20 -3.32 -0.65 -0.09 3.22 4.49
UK 3 -1.45 -0.21 -0.08 1.37 3.17 -1.56 -0.17 -0.02 1.54 3.32
6 -2.83 -0.46 -0.24 2.59 4.00 -2.95 -0.41 -0.13 2.82 4.25
Japan 3 -0.72 -0.23 -0.11 0.61 3.44 -0.78 -0.21 -0.09 0.69 3.36
6 -1.42 -0.50 -0.28 1.14 2.57 -1.46 -0.42 -0.26 1.20 2.73
Korea 3 -1.02 -0.26 -0.16 0.86 2.31 -1.00 -0.29 -0.32 0.68 2.09
6 -1.80 -0.61 -0.59 1.22 2.47 -1.88 -0.71 -0.73 1.16 2.30
Malaysia 3 -0.76 -0.21 0.00 0.76 2.15 -0.76 -0.22 0.02 0.77 2.15
6 -1.47 -0.36 -0.14 1.34 2.40 -1.48 -0.39 -0.01 1.46 3.13
Singapore 3 -0.84 -0.16 -0.13 0.71 3.94 -0.81 -0.16 -0.11 0.70 2.82
6 -1.69 -0.37 -0.36 1.33 3.77 -1.64 -0.34 -0.26 1.38 3.51
Taiwan 3 -0.46 -0.16 -0.16 0.31 2.83 -0.48 -0.13 -0.25 0.24 1.84
6 -0.89 -0.35 -0.43 0.47 2.25 -0.97 -0.38 -0.52 0.45 1.82
Country
Panel A: Portfolios Formed Based on
Past 3-Month Forecast Revision
Table III
Analyst Forecast Revisions for Earnings Momentum Portfolios
This table reports cumulative price-deflated earnings forecast revision for earnings portfolios over the next three (J=3) or six (J=6) months after portfolio
formation. Table values represent cumulative forecast revisions, expressed as a percentage of price on portfolio formation date. The earnings portfolios are
formed either based on past 3-month revision (Panel A) or past 6-month revision (Panel B). E5 (E1) portfolios consistent of firms that have experienced the
most (least) favorable revisions in the recent past. E3 is the middle portfolio. The Newey-West adjusted t-statistics for the difference between E1 and E5
portfolios are provided. The revisions are in respective local currencies.
Panel B: Portfolios Formed Based on
Past 6-Month Forecast Revision
P1 P3 P5 P5-P1 t-stat P1 P3 P5 P5-P1 t-stat
1 -1.01 0.37 1.33 2.34 6.26 -1.03 0.47 1.49 2.52 6.14
3 -0.89 0.53 1.22 2.11 5.92 -0.93 0.49 1.40 2.32 6.08
6 -0.70 0.49 1.18 1.88 5.96 -0.69 0.42 1.22 1.91 5.53
1 -0.63 0.62 1.54 2.17 6.01 -0.56 0.64 1.51 2.07 5.61
3 -0.38 0.69 1.32 1.71 5.72 -0.49 0.65 1.38 1.87 5.67
6 -0.23 0.65 1.25 1.48 6.13 -0.39 0.64 1.39 1.77 6.12
1 0.16 0.67 1.43 1.27 2.77 -0.06 0.75 1.58 1.64 3.79
3 0.00 0.74 1.33 1.33 3.55 -0.04 0.74 1.42 1.46 3.79
6 0.07 0.77 1.27 1.20 4.36 0.02 0.78 1.35 1.33 4.45
1 -0.28 0.31 0.66 0.94 2.26 -0.36 0.12 0.71 1.07 2.38
3 -0.28 0.31 0.61 0.88 2.44 -0.40 0.34 0.64 1.03 2.57
6 -0.25 0.33 0.49 0.75 2.60 -0.31 0.33 0.61 0.92 2.75
1 0.04 0.97 0.88 0.83 1.48 0.03 0.91 1.05 1.02 1.89
3 0.13 0.95 0.89 0.75 1.60 -0.03 0.90 1.08 1.11 2.31
6 0.10 0.92 1.07 0.96 2.99 0.09 0.94 1.08 0.98 2.38
1 -0.22 0.65 1.12 1.34 4.12 -0.35 0.57 1.38 1.73 5.08
3 -0.24 0.66 1.08 1.32 4.45 -0.41 0.58 1.35 1.75 5.73
6 -0.18 0.62 1.08 1.26 5.50 -0.30 0.59 1.24 1.54 5.85
1 -0.05 0.13 -0.06 -0.01 -0.03 0.09 0.03 -0.03 -0.12 -0.27
3 -0.04 0.06 -0.02 0.02 0.06 0.02 0.07 -0.06 -0.08 -0.22
6 0.00 0.08 -0.08 -0.08 -0.29 -0.01 0.10 -0.04 -0.03 -0.09
1 0.86 0.52 0.42 -0.44 -0.74 1.05 0.56 0.29 -0.76 -1.05
3 0.56 0.65 0.50 -0.06 -0.10 0.86 0.72 0.31 -0.56 -0.86
6 0.63 0.64 0.40 -0.22 -0.51 0.92 0.78 0.25 -0.67 -1.12
1 1.36 0.99 0.83 -0.53 -0.85 0.83 1.09 0.94 0.10 0.16
3 1.24 0.93 0.87 -0.36 -0.68 0.85 1.03 1.07 0.22 0.36
6 0.92 0.99 1.09 0.17 0.40 0.76 1.06 1.08 0.32 0.61
1 0.78 0.51 0.55 -0.23 -0.41 0.51 0.68 0.76 0.25 0.43
3 0.64 0.54 0.62 -0.02 -0.05 0.40 0.59 0.70 0.31 0.61
6 0.46 0.65 0.69 0.23 0.66 0.41 0.75 0.56 0.15 0.35
1 1.05 0.54 0.25 -0.80 -1.25 0.73 0.37 0.01 -0.73 -1.06
3 0.74 0.57 0.52 -0.22 -0.42 0.66 0.42 0.10 -0.56 -0.89
6 0.73 0.64 0.48 -0.25 -0.59 0.52 0.37 0.31 -0.21 -0.39
P1 P3 P5 P5-P1 t-stat P1 P3 P5 P5-P1 t-stat
Canada -0.25 0.62 1.08 1.33 3.94 Japan 0.19 0.09 -0.28 -0.47 -1.33
France 0.32 0.82 0.98 0.66 1.84 Korea 1.08 0.88 0.33 -0.75 -1.49
Germany -0.08 0.21 0.25 0.32 1.09 Malaysia 1.01 1.00 0.81 -0.20 -0.38
UK 0.12 0.65 0.74 0.61 2.35 Singapore 0.75 0.31 0.73 -0.02 -0.04
Australia -0.28 0.89 0.5 0.78 2.26 Taiwan 0.64 0.76 0.25 -0.39 -0.67
Hong Kong 0.04 1.05 0.89 0.85 2.07
Holding
Period, J
Panel A: Price Momentum Based on
Past 3-Month Returns
Panel B: Price Momentum Based on
Past 6-Month Returns
Country
Canada
France
Germany
UK
Table IV
Profitability of Price Momentum Strategies 
Panel C: 1-0-1 Strategy
Korea
Malaysia
Singapore
Taiwan
Australia
Hong Kong
Japan
At the end of each month from July 1987 to December 2000, stocks in each country are ranked on the basis of their return in the past 
three (six) months. Stocks are then assigned to five quintile portfolios and equal weighted returns are computed for each portfolio. 
The bottom 20% is assigned as the P1 portfolio and the top 20% as the P5 portfolio. The trading strategy J-P-K is implemented as 
Jegadeesh and Titman (1993): we construct overlapping portfolios. In each month, the portfolio with past winners (los ers) is an 
overlapping portfolio that consists of P5 (P1) portfolios in the previous K ranking months. Returns for the winner (loser) 
overlapping portfolios are the simple average of the returns of the six P5 (P1) portfolios. If a stock's return is missing  during the 
holding period, we replace it with the corresponding value-weighted market return. The price momentum portfolio (P5-P1) is the 
zero-cost portfolio that buys the winner portfolio and sells the loser portfolio (P5-P1) in each month.  Panel A reports the results for 
strategies based on past three month return. Panel B reports the results for strategies based on past six month return. The t-statistics 
are for the return of momentum portfolios (P5-P1). The returns are in respective local currencies. 
J P1 P3 P5 P5-P1 t-stat P1 P3 P5 P5-P1 t-stat
Australia 3 -1.63 -0.20 -0.01 1.61 6.26 -1.66 -0.18 0.07 1.72 5.76
6 -2.87 -0.42 -0.16 2.70 5.62 -3.07 -0.38 0.02 3.09 6.07
Canada 3 -2.65 -0.49 0.18 2.83 7.23 -2.76 -0.44 0.35 3.11 6.86
6 -4.87 -1.00 0.00 4.87 6.77 -5.08 -1.01 0.32 5.39 5.47
France 3 -1.35 -0.24 0.10 1.46 9.36 -1.44 -0.25 0.20 1.64 8.60
6 -2.47 -0.59 0.01 2.48 9.01 -2.60 -0.63 0.19 2.78 8.39
Germany 3 -1.06 -0.29 -0.05 1.01 1.97 -1.31 -0.22 0.04 1.35 2.14
6 -2.17 -0.66 -0.19 1.99 2.10 -2.66 -0.47 -0.02 2.65 3.12
Hong Kong 3 -1.42 -0.51 0.16 1.58 7.06 -1.83 -0.42 0.30 2.13 8.11
6 -2.91 -1.08 0.17 3.07 7.95 -3.37 -0.98 0.38 3.75 7.12
UK 3 -1.45 -0.22 -0.06 1.39 6.74 -1.66 -0.19 0.07 1.73 6.01
6 -2.74 -0.50 -0.22 2.52 6.60 -3.09 -0.48 -0.01 3.08 6.30
Japan 3 -0.65 -0.26 -0.08 0.57 4.07 -0.75 -0.27 -0.02 0.72 3.52
6 -1.25 -0.55 -0.21 1.04 3.46 -1.35 -0.56 -0.12 1.23 2.74
Korea 3 -1.19 -0.40 0.30 1.49 2.65 -1.46 -0.48 0.32 1.78 2.68
6 -2.25 -0.87 0.32 2.58 2.50 -2.71 -0.87 0.44 3.15 2.92
Malaysia 3 -0.65 -0.28 0.03 0.68 3.81 -0.63 -0.30 0.10 0.73 2.38
6 -1.22 -0.59 -0.04 1.17 3.99 -1.25 -0.68 0.17 1.42 2.89
Singapore 3 -0.76 -0.25 -0.06 0.69 6.03 -0.83 -0.27 0.00 0.82 4.86
6 -1.40 -0.56 -0.27 1.13 5.77 -1.61 -0.57 -0.11 1.50 4.49
Taiwan 3 -0.51 -0.24 -0.01 0.50 6.86 -0.60 -0.26 0.10 0.70 7.05
6 -1.10 -0.52 -0.03 1.06 6.80 -1.24 -0.59 0.12 1.36 6.99
Country
Panel A: Portfolios Formed Based on
Past 3-Month Returns
Table V
Analyst Forecast Revisions for Price Momentum Portfolios
Panel B: Portfolios Formed Based on
Past 6-Month Returns
This table reports cumulative price-deflated earnings forecast revision for price momentum portfolios over the next six month 
after portfolio formation. The price momentum portfolios are formed either based on past 3-month return or past 6-month return. 
The Newey-West t-statistics for the difference between P1 and P5 portfolios. The revisions are in respective local currencies. 
Country Portfolio P1 P2 P3 P3-P1 t-stat P1 P2 P3 P3-P1 t-stat
E1 -0.87 0.20 0.99 1.86 4.82 -0.56 0.23 0.90 1.45 4.22
E2 -0.17 0.49 0.98 1.15 3.57 -0.13 0.41 0.87 1.00 3.57
E3 -0.44 0.75 1.43 1.87 5.95 -0.34 0.71 1.28 1.62 5.62
E3-E1 0.44 0.55 0.44 0.21 0.48 0.38
t-value 1.45 2.35 1.49 0.79 2.44 1.54
E1 -0.47 0.12 1.18 1.65 4.60 -0.25 0.38 1.22 1.47 4.84
E2 -0.05 0.62 1.07 1.12 4.35 -0.18 0.56 1.11 1.30 6.71
E3 0.27 0.82 1.34 1.07 3.07 0.11 0.77 1.20 1.09 3.81
E3-E1 0.74 0.70 0.15 0.36 0.39 -0.02
t-value 2.41 3.28 0.50 1.41 2.04 -0.09
E1 -0.06 0.27 0.84 0.89 2.53 -0.02 0.48 0.96 0.98 3.37
E2 0.39 0.84 1.32 0.93 2.73 0.29 0.80 1.17 0.88 3.46
E3 0.38 1.11 1.48 1.10 3.55 0.44 1.07 1.37 0.93 3.54
E3-E1 0.43 0.84 0.64 0.46 0.59 0.41
t-value 1.69 3.80 3.23 1.99 3.33 2.12
E1 -0.55 -0.02 0.27 0.82 2.10 -0.44 0.00 0.27 0.71 2.22
E2 -0.09 0.39 0.43 0.52 1.47 -0.10 0.41 0.48 0.59 2.07
E3 0.22 0.52 0.83 0.62 1.72 0.14 0.44 0.78 0.64 2.23
E3-E1 0.77 0.54 0.57 0.58 0.45 0.51
t-value 3.45 3.28 3.00 3.00 3.16 3.13
E1 -0.10 0.64 0.70 0.80 1.72 0.08 0.64 0.65 0.57 1.45
E2 0.51 1.20 0.77 0.27 0.57 0.33 1.05 0.90 0.56 1.54
E3 0.23 0.79 1.70 1.46 3.50 0.30 1.00 1.47 1.17 3.26
E3-E1 0.34 0.15 1.00 0.22 0.36 0.82
t-value 0.91 0.44 2.63 0.77 1.21 2.52
E1 -0.28 0.27 0.88 1.15 4.64 -0.16 0.33 0.89 1.05 4.85
E2 -0.23 0.62 0.93 1.16 4.41 -0.17 0.56 0.82 0.99 4.48
E3 0.35 0.86 1.44 1.09 4.22 0.41 0.84 1.33 0.92 4.14
E3-E1 0.63 0.59 0.57 0.57 0.51 0.44
t-value 3.16 3.78 3.32 3.18 3.68 2.72
E1 0.12 0.03 -0.11 -0.24 -0.81 0.12 0.11 -0.05 -0.18 -0.71
E2 0.01 -0.04 -0.11 -0.12 -0.36 -0.07 -0.02 -0.05 0.02 0.07
E3 0.07 0.19 0.19 0.12 0.37 0.01 0.17 0.13 0.12 0.43
E3-E1 -0.05 0.16 0.30 -0.11 0.06 0.18
t-value -0.29 1.22 2.21 -0.70 0.51 1.43
E1 0.91 1.09 0.52 -0.40 -0.71 1.10 1.11 0.57 -0.53 -1.05
E2 0.59 0.41 0.45 -0.13 -0.26 0.67 0.51 0.26 -0.42 -0.94
E3 1.06 0.80 0.54 -0.52 -0.99 0.88 0.79 0.47 -0.40 -0.84
E3-E1 0.15 -0.30 0.02 -0.22 -0.33 -0.10
t-value 0.55 -1.05 0.08 -0.85 -1.30 -0.36
E1 1.02 1.20 0.67 -0.36 -0.68 0.97 1.23 0.97 -0.01 -0.01
E2 0.72 0.99 1.24 0.51 1.00 0.71 1.02 1.06 0.35 0.78
E3 0.91 1.07 1.19 0.28 0.54 0.80 1.05 1.21 0.41 0.85
E3-E1 -0.11 -0.14 0.52 -0.18 -0.18 0.24
t-value -0.32 -0.40 1.76 -0.54 -0.58 0.74
Table VI Continued on the next page.
Panel B: 6-1-6
Table VI
Two-way Classification based on earnings and price momentum
Japan
Korea
Malaysia
Australia
Panel A: 6-1-3
Hong Kong
UK
Canada
France
Germany
At the end of each month from July 1987 to December 2000, all stocks within each country are ranked on the basis of their 
past six-month return and assigned to three equally-sized price portfolios (P1, P2 and P3). All stocks are then independently 
ranked by their past six-month forecast revision and assigned to three equally-sized earnings portfolios (E1, E2 and E3). 
After these procedures, each stock belongs to one of nine portfolios. We consider standard K-P-J momentum strategies with 
holding period of three and six month. Panel A reports the results for holding period of three months and Panel B reports 
the results for holding period of six months. The returns for individual countries are in their respective local currencies. The 
combined results, all momentum countries, and all non-momentum countries are in U.S. dollar returns. 
Table VI Continued..
Country Portfolio P1 P2 P3 P3-P1 t-stat P1 P2 P3 P3-P1 t-stat
E1 0.43 0.77 0.16 -0.27 -0.56 0.52 0.74 0.23 -0.28 -0.71
E2 0.58 0.78 0.55 -0.03 -0.07 0.44 0.72 0.43 -0.01 -0.02
E3 0.56 0.89 0.95 0.39 0.94 0.68 0.97 0.93 0.25 0.65
E3-E1 0.13 0.12 0.80 0.16 0.23 0.70
t-value 0.36 0.44 2.61 0.55 0.99 2.41
E1 0.49 0.55 0.12 -0.37 -0.76 0.55 0.61 0.20 -0.35 -0.84
E2 0.83 0.55 0.21 -0.62 -1.02 0.50 0.42 0.36 -0.14 -0.30
E3 0.36 0.31 0.21 -0.15 -0.28 0.35 0.30 0.32 -0.03 -0.05
E3-E1 -0.13 -0.24 0.09 -0.20 -0.31 0.12
t-value -0.40 -0.61 0.33 -0.81 -1.33 0.48
E1 -0.35 0.27 0.94 1.29 5.31 -0.19 0.37 0.95 1.14 5.46
E2 -0.04 0.54 0.86 0.91 3.67 -0.10 0.52 0.81 0.92 4.45
E3 0.05 0.82 1.39 1.34 4.93 0.06 0.77 1.29 1.23 5.84
E3-E1 0.40 0.56 0.45 0.25 0.40 0.35
t-value 2.63 5.09 3.28 2.04 4.01 2.92
E1 0.96 0.31 0.00 -0.96 -2.01 0.91 0.40 0.18 -0.73 -1.78
E2 0.47 0.04 -0.04 -0.51 -1.26 0.30 0.09 0.10 -0.20 -0.55
E3 0.75 0.39 0.36 -0.39 -0.82 0.57 0.32 0.35 -0.23 -0.56
E3-E1 -0.21 0.08 0.36 -0.34 -0.07 0.16
t-value -1.02 0.48 1.61 -1.86 -0.48 0.72
Singapore
Panel A: 6-1-3 Panel B: 6-1-6
All
Momentum 
Countries
All Non-
Momentum 
Countries
Taiwan
size t-stat past Rev t-stat past Ret t-stat
Australia 3.02 1.32 8.19 5.14
0.95 0.45 14.64 4.38
0.68 0.34 3.91 2.38 13.19 4.02
Canada -1.04 -0.44 8.22 3.59
-2.24 -1.14 13.40 5.26
-2.71 -1.38 3.79 1.85 11.94 5.19
France 3.17 1.29 7.41 4.61
2.43 1.10 9.51 3.27
2.10 0.94 4.87 3.90 8.23 2.93
Germany 4.48 1.89 5.58 4.88
3.42 1.80 5.74 1.93
3.01 1.59 4.76 4.01 4.52 1.47
Hong Kong 3.61 1.09 5.29 2.35
1.61 0.49 9.00 3.74
1.16 0.36 3.56 1.88 8.23 3.42
UK 1.79 0.89 7.94 8.21
1.31 0.76 11.50 7.15
0.97 0.57 4.80 4.85 9.85 5.69
Japan -1.51 -0.67 1.42 0.66
-0.64 -0.28 -1.91 -0.94
-0.61 -0.26 2.16 1.03 -2.42 -1.19
Korea -10.64 -2.70 -1.18 -0.52
-10.72 -2.45 -1.93 -0.97
-10.72 -2.41 -0.52 -0.24 -1.74 -0.92
Malaysia -4.03 -1.27 2.52 0.82
-2.69 -0.83 3.20 1.13
-3.33 -1.03 2.35 0.88 2.23 0.82
Singapore -2.80 -1.03 3.26 1.57
-2.49 -1.03 2.34 0.79
-2.73 -1.13 2.72 1.24 1.63 0.56
Taiwan 0.03 0.01 -1.16 -0.70
0.49 0.17 -2.75 -0.68
0.89 0.30 -0.50 -0.33 -1.49 -0.40
Table VII
 Fama-MacBeth Cross-Secional Regressions
In each month from July 1987 to December 2000, we estimate cross-sectional regressions of 
individual stock's buy-and-hold return over the next six months on size; prior six month forecast 
revision and prior six month return. Each explanatory variable is scaled to [0,1] according to its 
ordinal ranking. The reported coefficients are the time series means of coefficients from regressions 
in each month. The t-statistics are computed using Newey-West standard error of the means. 
Variables Definition Source
Corruption Perception
Index (CPI)
Ranks countries in terms of the degree to which corruption is perceived to exist among 
public officials and politicians. Average betweem 1988-1992, 1995-2001. Scale from 0 to 
10; with lower scores implying higer levels of corruption.
Transparency International
www.transparency.org
Efficiency of Judicial
System (JE)
Assessment of the 'efficienc and intergrity of the legal environment as it affects business, 
particularly foreign firms'. Average between 1980-1983. Scale from 0 to 10; with lower 
scores, lower effiency level. 
La Porta et al.(1998) from
Business International Corp.
Accounting Standard (AS) Index created by examining and rating companies 1990 annual reports on their inclusion or 
omission of 90 items. These items fall into seven categories (general information, income 
statements, balance sheets, funds flow statement, accounting standards, stock data, and 
special items). 
International accounting and
auditing trends, Center for 
International Financial Analysis 
and Research (La Porta et 
al.(1998))
Insider Laws (IL) Five variables for insiders laws:
(1) 1 if tippees are legally considered to be secondary insiders;
(2) 1 if an insider is held liable for tipping third parties and encouraging them to trade
(3) 1 if violation of the insider trading law is a criminal offense
(4) 1 if the law grants 'injured' investors a private right of action
(5) 1 if monetary penalties are proportional to insiders' trading profits
Add up (1) to (5)
Beny (1999) from International
Insider Dealing (Mark Stamp and 
Carson Welsh, eds. 1996); Insider 
Trading: the Laws of Europe, the 
United States, and Japan 
(Emmanuel Gaillard, ed. 1992).
Table VIII. Country Characteristics Variables Definitions
Canada 0.82 1.77 9.25 74 5
France 0.92 1.33 8.00 69 3
Germany 0.78 0.92 9.00 62 3
U.K. 0.96 1.54 10.00 78 3
Australia 0.92 1.91 10.00 75 4
Hong Kong 0.65 0.98 10.00 69 3
Japan 0.07 -0.03 10.00 65 2
Korea -0.38 -0.67 6.00 62 5
Malaysia 0.03 0.32 9.00 46 3
Singapore 0.40 0.15 10.00 78 4
Taiwan -0.17 -0.21 6.75 65 4
Dependent Variable JE AS IL CPI Adj.Rsq.
CPI 0.83 0.08 0.39 0.81
(3.69) (2.57) (1.21)
EMOM 0.21 0.31
(2.35)
EMOM 0.03 0.25
(2.11)
EMOM -0.09 -0.08
(-0.51)
EMOM 0.24 0.64
(4.38)
PMOM 0.34 0.24
(2.03)
PMOM 0.04 0.15
(1.67)
PMOM -0.03 -0.11
(-0.11)
PMOM 0.38 0.50
(3.29)
CPI Beta
EMOM 0.24 -0.71
(2.91) (-1.64)
PMOM 0.29 -1.26
(2.86) (-2.04)
Panel B: Cross-Sectional Regressions of Momentum on Corruption Characteristics
Panel C: Fama-MacBeth cross-sectional regressions of annual momentum profits on CPI and country beta
Earnings
Momentum
Price
Momentum
4.16
5.11
9.05
9.05
6.85
5.32
Table IX
Corruption and Momentum
Accounting 
Standard 
(AS)
Insider
Laws (IL)
Judicial 
Efficiency 
(JE)
Corruption: CPI 
Average (1988-2001)
Panel A: Average Momentum Profits and Country Characteristics
6.64
7.96
8.47
8.58
7.42
Panel A reports average momentum profits (for the J=6, K=6 strategy where J and K represent holding period 
and ranking period respectively) over the sample period and the average corruption characteristics defined in 
Table VIII. Panel B reports cross-sectional regressions of average momentum profits on various corruption 
characteristics. Panel C reports Fama-MacBeth regressions of annual momentum profits on CPI and annual 
country beta estimated with respect to the value-weighted world market index. 
